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Scope

In an article in the Spring 2012
issue

of

Trial Trends entitled, Il/hen

Undefended

the

Monlana Insured Seltles and

Assigns Nghts in Retørn For a Coaenant

Not To Execute, the author examined
the insured's tight to settle a case
when the insuter refuses a defense.
Specifically, the article dealt with the
increasingly common situation where
the undefended insuted is forced to
settle by stipulating to judgment, and
assigning his tights against his insurer
to the claimant in return for the
claimant's covenant not to execute
on the insured's assets.

The natural segue for that article
is examination of the insuredt dght
to settle when the insurer purports to
fully defend, but does so under reservation of rights with the express
intention of not indemnifying. This
article will explore that topic and
specifically addtess the extent to
which the insured may settle the case
and assign his rights against the insurer in return for a covenant when

the insutet is defending but tefusing
indemnity.
As the prior article reflects,
Montana has substantial case law
developing the duty to defend and
the dghts and remedies of the insured when the insurer wtongfully
refuses defense.2 In a Montana nutshell, if the insurer wrongfuüy refuses to defend, it has breached the
policy contract and freed the insured

io fend for himself regardless of
the policy's cooperation clause. The
insured, who has no duty to defend
himself in the first place, may settle
by stipulating to judgment and assigning to the claimant any dghts
he has against the insurer in return
fot the claimant's covenant not to
execute on the insured's property.
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In Montana, the settlement is presumed reasonable and not collusive,
but the insurer can challenge those
ptesumptions.
The insurer which wrongly denies defense will be estopped from
raising defenses it could have taised
in the underþing action. Ultimately,
in Montana, the insuter in the wrong
will be liable for the underþing or
"confessed" judgment, the insured's
attorfley fees and costs expended in
defending the underþing claims,
intetest on the judgment, and attorney fees in the coverage action that
are ÍecoYerable under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act. All of
this follows from wrongful failure

to defend.
However, what if the insurer
undettakes defense, but does so urìder reservation of rights? The "reservatson of rights" letter is the insurer's
notice to the insuted that it accepts
tendet of defense of the claim but
believes there is no coverage fot all.
or part of the claim,.so that it does
not ultimately intend to indemnify in
the event a verdict against the insured
results. Implicitly, this means the
insuter intends no attempt at settlement either which is important, because the duty to settle is an integral
part of the insurer's obligation in
Montana under Cibson u. Great ll/estern

party, and, second, that the insurer

will defend the insured in claims
for such liability, The duty to defend
is different from the duty to indemnify, independent from the duty to
indemnifii, and broader than the indemnification duty created in the
same insutance- contract.4 The duty
to defend atises when a complaint
against an insured alleges facts, which
if proven, would result in coverage,s
or when the "insured sets forth facts
which represent a risk covered by the
terms of an insurance policy."ó The
insurer must defend on the allegations that fall within the policy no
m^tter how groundless, false, or
baseless the suit may be.7

The duty to indemnify is narrower. To obtain indemnity, it is the
insured's burden to prove on the facts
that the claim falls into policy coverConsequently, the insutet may
have to defend because of gtoundless
allegations made in the complaint
even though it believes the insured
can never prove coverage. The Montana Supreme Court in Farmers Unton
age.8

Mat. In¡. Co. u. Staples
that

if

Q004)'g warned

the pleadings allege claims

within coverage but the insurer
believes ithas a legitimate reason
to refuse defense, it should tender
defense under reservation of rights
and file a declantory action.

Fire Ins. Co. (1,984).3

Defending when the insurer
believes there is no coverage seems
illogical. The insurer does so because
of the difference between obligations
of defense and indemnity. Recall
that liability poJicies such as autq
homeowners, and commetcial general
(CGL) all contain two distinct promises: fìrst, that the insuret will indemnify the insured against loss by
reason of legal liabiJity to a third

The Insuredts Situation Where
the Insurer Defends Under
Reservation of Rights.
If the insurer tefuses to defend,
the insuted is ftee to settle the case.lo

if

the insurer denying coverage follows the advice of the coutt

Howevet,

in

Staples Q004),

it will provide

a

defense to the insuted along with a

reservation of rights letter indicating
that it does not plan on paying. The

PecB
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insurer will also file an action seeking
a declaratoty judgment that there is
no coverâge for the claim and that it
should be relieved of duties under
the policy. The insurer may even give
the insured notice that, if it prevails
in the declaratory action, it intends to
seek reimbursement from the insuted
for any defense costs incurred in
defending the allegations.ll
While these procedures are good
defense pracdce, they still place the
insured in peril. Consider the situation in which Ribi Immunochem
Research, Inc. in \)Øeitern Montana
found itself when it was defended
under reservation of rights in a substantial environmental tort case by its
CGL insurer, Travelers Casualty and
Surety Company.l2 Thc coverage
issue was whether damage from contaminatton by Ribi's disposal of hazardous wastes in the Bitterroot Valley
Sanitary Landfill was "sudden and

unexpected" so as to be an exception
to the policy pollution exclusion, an
issue on which courts around the

nation have split. Travelers defended
under reservation of rights and a
notice to the insured that they intended to seek reimbursement of
their defense costs. When the Montana Supreme Court ultimately ruled
aclversely to Ribi, the company not
only suffered the loss it had tried to
transfer to its insuret, but it also
had to reimburse the insurer for the
defense costs incurred in trial and
appellate couf t pf oceedings.
As the author pointed out in the
last article, the risk-averse insured
paid a premium to the risk-neutral
insurer on an agreement that risk of
Ioss and risk

of

defense costs were

transferred to the insurer. $7hen the
insurer tenders defense under teservation of rights, the insured is confronted with potentiaþ ruinous
economic risk, which he sought to
transfer to the insurer in return for
the premium paid. Couple that with
the possibility of having to reimburse
the insurer for any defense provided
and one can see the tremendous pres-

M O N TA N
,Assocíate Member of the Unlted States Brain Injury

sure that will drive the insured to
protect himself even if he is purportedly receiving a defense from the

insurer. I say purportedly, because the
carcjer defending under reservation
of rights is invariably not negotiating
for setdement, which is an integral
part of defense.

Is the Insurer Providing Defense
if it Won't Explore Settlement?
\)Øith regard to the insured rights
to settle his own case, should the

insurer that provides a defense under
reservation of dghts while seeking a
declaratory judgment of no coverage
be tteated any different than the insurer that refuses defense in the first
place? Does the insured have any
less need to protect itself where
the defense is being provided? The
situation merits analysis.
On the positive side in such a
case, the insurer provides defense
expenses and an attorney who, under
Montana's In Re Røles of Professional
Condac/3 case, owes sole duty of
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fidelity to the insured. To a certain
extent, this addresses the conflict of
interest inherent in accepting the
insurer's defense duting coverage
disputes. On the negative side, the

'

insurer is still in control of the litigation to the extent it controls negotiations, and the insuter will not tender
any money offers until the coverage
dispute is decided against it. The
insured has little way of knowing
whether the liabiJity loss will ultimately fall on him. If the insurer is
right, the insuted may suffer a catastrophic loss of assets in satisfying a
liability verdict and possibly reimbursing attoffrcy fees. If the insuter is
wrong, it may face the insured's claim
in tot for failure to setde within
Limits and a clasm for bteach of
contract for failure to indemnify.

5) whether the insured has demanded

that the insutet settle within the

policy limits;
6) whether the company has given

due consideration to any offer of
contdbution made by the insured.ls

The Montana Supreme Court
recognized the duty to setde as patt
of the fìduciary duty of good faith
and fair dealing inherent in every
insurance policy in Cib¡on u. IY. Fire
Ins. Co., (1984):16

One of the usual benefits of a
liability insurance policy is the
settlement of claims without

litigation, ot at least without
tital if the cause is litigated.
The implied obligation of
good faith and far dealing
requires the insuter to settle in

What is the Insurer's Duty to
Settle if it Denies Indemnity?
Since the landmarkJexen u.
ODaniella case in 1,962, it has been
established in Montana tha;t àn insurer is liable to its insured for failure
to accept a reasonable settlement
offer on a clum against the insured,
and that the insure.t must give the
interests of its insured equal consideration with its own interests. Jessen
said the defending insurer must

considet the following factors in
determining whether to settle for
the benefit of its insured:
1) whether, by reason

of the sevetity

of

the plaintiff's injuries, any
verdict is Jikely to be greatly in
excess of the policy Jimits;
2) whether the facts in the case
indicate that a defendant's verdict
on the issue of liability is doubtful;
3) whether the company has given

due regatd to the recommendations of its trial counsel;
4) whether the insured has been

infotmed of all settlement
demands and offers;
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an appropriate case, although
the express terms of the policy
do not impose the duty.

If

the duty to settle is an inherent
feat.)re of the insurer's obligations to
the insured, can arry insuret purport
to provide a full defense when it will
entertain no offers of settlement,
because it has raised a coverage issue? That question illustrates the
fundamental conflict between the
insured and the insurer defending
him under reservation of rights.

unilaterally settled while its insurer,
Safeco, was not in breach of its
promises to defend ot to indemnifrT,
Peris involved an automobile
injury claim in which Safeco fully
defended its insured with no reservation of rights and engaged in negotiations for settlement. After having
rejected eadter offers of limits,
Safeco tendeted the $100,000 policy
limits, which were then refused by the
third party claimant. The insuted,
who was worried about excess liability, then unilatetally settled the case
for $35,894.85 over the limits. Safeco
knew of the negotiations but neither
consented nor objected. Safeco contributed its $100,000limit and the
insured contributed the balance. In
essence, Peris is a case in which the
insurer kept its promise to defend
and indemnify, and the insured, unhuppy with negotiations, stipulated to
settlement without corìsent of the
insurer. The insured then used that
settlement to bring a cause of action
under the unfair claims settlement
practices act, MCA $ 33-18-201 and
24Z,before the undedying claim was
adjudicated.

In the bad faith suit, the jury
awarded the insured Peris the excess
he paid over the limits plus $250,000
punitive damages. On appeal, Safeco
argued that the insured's conduct
breached the policy's "No Action"
clauses which read:

The Insured's Right to Settle
When the Insurer is Defending
Under Reservation of Rights.
The Montana Supreme Court
has nevet been called upon to rule

specifically on a case in which the
insuted who is being defended under
reservation of rights is forced to
stipulate to judgment and assþ
rights against the insurer in return for
a covenant not to execute. Howevet,
the court's decision in Peri¡ u. Safeco
Ins. Co. (1966)17 would appear to
allow such a procedure. Ironically,
Peris is a case in which the insured

S 5 . . . The insured shall not
except at his own cost, voluntadly make any payment . . .
other than for such immediate
medical and surgical relief to
others as shall be imperarive at
'

the time of accident.
S 6 . . . No action shall lie
against the company until after
full compliance with all the
terms of this policy nor until
the amount of the insuted's obIigation to pay shall have been
finally determined eithet by
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judgment against the insured
aftet acrual trial or by written
agreement of the insured, the
claimant and the company.
The Montana Supreme Court
held that, under MCA S 33-1.8-242,
". . . it is not necessary that settlement be approved by the insurer or
judgment be tendered before an
insured may file a cause of action
against his or her insuter alleging
violation of the act." Moreover, the
court held rl¡'at ". . . an insured is
entitled to maintain a cause of action
under the Äct prior to either an adjudication of the underþing claim of
the third part¡ agatnst the insured or
a written agreement by the insurance
company settling the case, notwithstanding a 'No ,{.ction' clause in the
insuted's policy." The court rejected
Safeco's assertiorr that the Peris type
settlement encourages collusion
between the insuted and claimant,
which makes the insurer liable.
Peri¡lnas two major imports for
our inquiry: first, if the insured, Peris,
could unilaterally settle the case and
use the settlement as the basis for his
bad faith action, then it follows that
he could, in the alternative, have
assþed to the claimant his right to
do so in settlement of the excess for
which he was l.gully obligated; second, if the insured whose insurer is
defending and indemnifiiing has the
rights the Montana Supreme Court
allowed Peris, why would the insured
being defended under reservation of
dghts have any less remèdres? Peris
should be all the authority one needs
to allow an insured being defended

under reservation of rights to settle
by confessing judgment, assigning to
the claimant rights against the insuref, and accepting a covenant not

to execute in return.
Other courts have tecognized
that the insured being defended under reservation or rights n'as a right to
protect himself by settling the case
and that he can do so by stipulating
to judgment and assigning his rights
against his insuret in return for
claimant's covenant not to execute on
his assets. Minnesota, for instance,
allows the insuted being defended
under teservation of rights to protect
himself by settling and assigning. In
Miller u. Shøgart (1982),18 the insuret
fìled a declaratory action shortly aftet
the subject auto accident to determine whether there was coverage for
both the insured auto owner and the
driver. Milbank Mutual hired separate
counsel for the insured and the ddver
at its expense. The declaratory action
was decided against Milbank which
then appealed. Plaintiff then filed her
lawsuit against the insured owner and
driver. The parties to the personal
injury action advised Milbank that
they were negotiating settlement and
Milbank refused while the coverage
question was still pending. Upon
learning that Milbank would not
paracipate in settlement discussions,
the defendant insured owner and
defendant drivet confessed judgment
for $100,000, twice the policy limits,
and received a covenant not to execute. Subsequently, the Minnesota
Supteme Court afftmed that
Milbank was wrong in its denial

of

coverage.

When plaintiff sought to recover
the stipulated judgment from
Milbank, the company argaed rhat
thete had been no tdal on the merits
so that plaintiff's claim was still an
unliquidated tort claim. The court
refused that afgument saying that, as
between the plaintiff and defendants,
the underþing tort claim was liquidated and reduced to judgment. The
court also refused Milbank's position
that a settlement which effectiveþ
obligates defendant insureds to pay
nothing þy reason of the covenant)
cannot be the basis for a claim
against the insuret saylng again that
the confessed judgment "effectively
Jiquidates defendant's personal liabil-

ity." (Ihe \X/yoming Supreme Court

in

Cain¡co Ins. Co.

Co.

a.

Amoco Prodaction

in 2002, also held

as a matter

of

public policy that inclusion of the
covenant not to sue in the settlement
between the insured and claimant
does not negate the fact of the judgment against the insuted and does
not bar the claimant from pressing
the insuted's assþed rights against
the insurer.l)
The Miller court then considered
whethet the insureds.had breached

theit contractual duty to cooperate
by confessing judgment.20 The court
looked to determine whethet the
insurer had breached its policy promises to defend and indemnify so as
to release the insureds to settle. It
concluded that Milbank "Írever abandoned its insured" nor "repudiated its
policy obligations."2l Nevertheless,
the court noted that "neither did it
accept responsibility for the insured's

liability exposure," so that the

'T consider trial fuijaryt as the znh dnclrzr euerJet inagined b1t man, b-y which
a gnaernment can be held to tbe principles of ifs constitation."
Tbomas
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question was the rights and duties of
the parties while the coverage question is being resolved.22 The court
found that the insureds' right to ptotect themselves while coverage was in

doubt trumped any right of the insurer to have them wait to settle until
the covetage question was resolved.23

The court said:

If,

as here, the insureds are

offered a settlement that effectively reJieves them of. any
personal liabiliry at a nme
when their insutance coverage
is in doubt, surely it cannot be
said that it is not in their best
interest to accept the offer.
Nor, do we think, can the
insuret who is disputing coverage compel the insureds to
forego a settlement which is
in their best interests.2a

reasonable and prudent saying, "...
the test âs to v/hether the settlement is
reasonable and prudent is what a reasonably ptudent person in the position
of the defendant would have settled
for on the merits of plaintiff's cli7m."26
In the \Øashington case of Safeco
Ins. Co. of America u. Batler (1,992),27
Safeco defended a shooting case
under reservation of rights on the

ground that the shooting was not a
coveted "accident" under the policy,
The insured settled with the badlyinjured plaintiff on a stipulated judg-

ment for $3,000,000, an assignment
of the insured's rights against Safecq
and a covenaflt not to execute. The
court found that such an agreement
was not a release from liability but
rathet "... an agfeement to seek
recovery only from a specific asset the proceeds of the insutance policy
and the rights owed by the insurer to
the insured."28 The case does

eonsequendy, the court held that
the insureds did not bteach their duty
to cooperate with the insurer.
The court summarily disposed

of Milbankt argument that the judgment was the product of fraud or
collusion noting that no evidence of
such fraud or collusion existed. More
importantly, the court said that "[t
seems to us, if a risk is to be borne,
it is better to have the insurer who
makes the decision to contest coyeragebeat the risk." The court noted
that the risk of not participating in
settlement negotiations is that of "...
being required to pay, even within its

policy limits, an inflated judgment."2s

Finall¡ the court held that the
plaintiff has the burden of proof

of

showing that the fudgment was

not

àppear to have involved a challenge
to the insured's right to setde in the

situation. lØe should note that the

\Tashingon Supreme Court in the

prior case of Tank a. State Farm Fire
dy Cas. Co. (1,986)2e and in Søfeco Ins.
Co. of Americåo established that the
insurer defending under reservalion
of rights has an "enhanced obligation" to protect the interests ofits
insured.
In the 1975 decision of Johansen
u. Califorruia State Aatornobile Association

Inter-Insørance Børeaø,31

the California

Supreme Court sitting en bancupheld
a stipulated settlement and assþment whete the insurer denied
indemnity. In Johansen, the insurer

rejected settlement offers because

it

was engaged in a declaratory acúon

disputing coverage in which it
prevailed. Prior to judgment in the
declaratory action, the insureds.
suffered a tort verdict fat in excess

of

the limits of theit auto policy.
Subsequently, an appellate court reversed the coverage decision that had
been favorable to the insurer. The
insureds then settled with the claimantby assigning their rights against
the insuret in return for a covenant

not to execute.

In essence, /a ltansen is a case in
which the insuted was legaþ liable
fot an excess verdict that the insurer
says was not its responsibility, The
insured unilaterally settled on an
assignment and covenant, and the
Caltfonra Supreme Court upheld it
sayrng, " Cahfortia authorities establish that an insurer who fails to accept a reasorlable settlement offer

within poJicy limits because it believes the poJicy does not provide
coverage assumes the risk that it
will be held liable for all damages
resulting ftom such refusal, including
damages in excess of applicable
policy [imits."32
The court rejected the insurer's
argument that Jiabilty does not attach
so long as the insurer's denial was
made in good faith, pointing out that
the identical argument had been
made and tejected in the seminal case
of Comønale u. Traders dv Cen. Irus. Co.

in

The coutt in Johansen saw
no reason to depatt from that settled
lav¡. The court quoted Comunale: "An
insurer who denies coverage does so
at its own risk, and, although its position may not have been entirely
groundless, if the denial is found to
be wrongful it is liable for the full
1958.33

Trial Trends Content
Contact the Tríal Trends Editorial Board (see inside front cover) at mtla@mt.net
if you have suggestions or submissions. Deadlines for submissions to upcoming
issues of Trial Trends are September 10, 2012, and February 10, June 10, 2013.
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amountwhich will compensate the
insured for all the detriment caused

,

1

by the insured's breach of the express
and implied obligations of the
contfact."34

involved

defend, the insured is not required to
abandon control of his own defense
as a price of presetving his claim,
disputed by the insurer, that the insurer pay any judgment."37 In Ta/or,

Ins. C0.,36 in
1.978, a Florida appellate court expressly found that Safeco had not
breached its duty to defend driver,
E,aùTaylor, even while it was challenging coverage. Nevertheless, the
court said, 'Just as the insurer is not
required to abandon its contest of a

Safeco defended until it won a declaratory judgment that the defendant
was not an insured under the poJicy,
then Safeco withdrew before trial.
S7hen the insured subsequently appealed the declaratory judgment,
Safeco again stepped in to defend at
tdal on the possibility tha;t the defendant would be declared an insured.
However, Safeco was rebuffed by its
insured, EarITaylor, who refused the
defense and elected to go to trial
unrepresented where he settled the
claim by confessing judgment. The
appellate court held that Taylor did
not breach the cooperation clause and
was entitled to effect settlement of
his case.38 The issue of whethet there
wâs coverage that would bind Safeco
to pay the confessed judgment
remained to be determined.3e

duty to pay as a condition of fulfilling an assumed or admitted duty to

The court inTrylor said in dicta
that, because Safeco did not breach

Notably,

Comønale

a

refusal to defend, which arguably
distinguishes it from cases in which
the insurer is defending but denying
indemnity. However, .the California
coutt in Johansen sasd the insurer's
liabiJity in Comønale did not turn on

refusal to defend and quoted
Comunale: "The decisive factor in
fìxing the extent of (the insurer's)
liability is not the refusal to defend; it
is the refusal to accept an offer of
settlement within the policy limits."3s

In Ta/or

u. Safeco

any duty to defend, if coverage was
ultimately declared, Safeco would
only be liable for any reasonable
settlement up to the limits of coverage.ao The holding is illogical and
runs contrary to âuthority in Montana. In cases where the insurer has
refused to defend, the Montana
coutts have held insurers responsible
for stipulated settlements in excess of
the limits.al The question is whether
failure to indemnifr cases should be
treated any differentJy. IØhere the

rights assþed by the insured in
settlement as a result of denial of
indemnity include bad faith tort,
the limits are hrcIevant since we are
talking about the insurer's liabiJity,
which is not governed by limits of its
insured's poJicy and not the insured's,

which is.

The Aizona case of United
uiæs Autorztobile

Association

u.

Ser-

Morrisa2

(1987) involved USA,{s clatm rhat
there was no coverage under their

homeowner's policy for anintentional
shooting by theit insureds. The company provided full defense under

CV available on røquest

30 Hwy 91 S.

.

Suite 103

. Dillon, MT 59725

For more informøtion,
pleøse contoct Juckie @ (406) 683-3171 or jduschønek@burretthospitul.org.
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what the court determined to be a
reservation of rights undet a poJicy

with a liability limit of $100,000 and
an exclusion fot injuries "expected or
intended by the insured." The insutance defense lawyer for the insureds
notifìed USAA that the insureds were
negotiatìng settlement with the plaintiff, and USAÁ. objected but took no
part in the negotiation. The insureds
settled by confessing judgment for
$100,000 in tetutn for a covenant not
to sue.
On appeal, the Arizona Supteme
Court sitting en banc framed the issues
of frst imptession which are squarely
on point with our inquiry: "1,. May
two insuteds being defended under a
reservation of rights protect themselves by entering into a settlement
agreement without breaching the
cooperation clause? 2, If so, is the
settlement binding on the insurance
carcier?"43 The ,\rizona Supreme
Court follov¡ed Minnesota's Miller u.
Shøgørtin fìnding that, whle the
insurer "did not 'abandon'its insured
by bteaching any policy obligation,
neither did it accept full responsibiJity

for theit liabilty exposure."44
The coutt characterized USr{r{s
position as "...the coopetation clause
gave it a rryht to fotce the insureds to
reject any settlement, no matter ho\Á/
reasonable, risk trial, and place them-

selves at danger of a judgment larger
than the policy limits or one that
might not be covered."as To allow
that, the court feasoned, would be to
allow the insurer two bites at the
apple: It could defend the case to
avoid liabiliry and, if that faüed, file
the declaratoty action to avoid coverage, and escape liability by winning
either. During both bites, the insured
would risk {ìnancial catastrophe.
Accepting USAA's position would
completely free the insurer from that
part of the duty to defend, which
consists of the duty to settle.
The court tejected US,{lt's position but acknowledged that the
insured's settlement is often motivated by "strongly felt need fot economic survival" and the plaintiff's
desire for a quick judgment.46 "The
better result would permit the insurer
to raise the coverage defense and also
permit an insured to protect himself
from the risk of nofl-coverage or
excess judgment, while at the same
time protecting the insurer from

unreasonable agreements between
the claimant and the insured."aT
Consequently, the court held that
the insured being defended under a
reservation of rights has the right to
settle by confessing judgment and
receiving a covenant not to sue and
can do so without breaching the

cooperation

clause.as

The court then held that the
insuter is not bound by the settlement
unless the insured or claimant
showed that the settlement was reasonable and prudent. It specifically
rejected USA,{s argument that USA,\
had "an absolute right to litigate all
aspects of the liabiJity case including
liabilty and amount of damages," a

position that the court said would
destroy the putpose of allowing the
insured to settle in the fìrst place. The
court affirmed that the insured
doesn't have to prove that he would
have lost the case but only "that
given the circumstances affecting
liability, defense and coverage, the
settlement was reasonable."ae Citing
Miller u. Shøgart, the court said, "The
test as to whether the settlement v/as
reasonable and prudent is what a
reasonably prudent person in the
insured's position would have settled
fot on the medts of the claimant's
case."5o
Ìù7e

should note here that Montanahas, since Independent Milk dY
Cream (1923) presumed, according to

MC,\

S 28-1.1.-31.6

(formedy

S 8169

rev. Codes 1921), that the insuted's
settlement in the face of breach by
the insurer is reasonable. The presumption is rebuttable, but the burden is on the inswentndet Independent

What would your pract¡ce be like without MTLA?
You could find all the auto insurance coverage going toward your client's
medical bills while his health insurer pays nothing. You could be hiring experts to
help you apportion the damages attributable to your client not wearíng her seat
belt. You could be calling all your colleagues, one by one, day after day, trying
to find out if anybody had any experience with, depositions of, or information
on the defense medical expert that is about to examine your client.
Increasing your membership level helps assure that MTLA continues its
legislative work, provides listserve access to the collective expertise of all MTLA
members, and so much more.
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Milk
Milk

d2 Cream.sl \Xlh/Le Independent
d2 Cream was a fail.ure

to defend

case, thefe is no reason the rule

should be different for failure to
ìndemnify. The insured needs the
same protections, and the insurer
is the party that makes the expert
decision to take the risk of denying
coverage forcing the insured to
protect himself.
As was pointed out when the
author treâted settlement in the face
of refusal to clefend, the insured who
is being denied indemnity musr negotiate to avoid financial catastrophe,
has meager negotiating power, and
must do whatever it takes to free
himself from the loss that will cause
înancial ruin. The insurer that will
indemni$r is risk neutral and has the
Ioss built in to its actuarial calculations, premiums, and reserves. ft
would be unfair to judge the settlement procured by the insured by

what the insurer, p^tty in a power^
ful negotiation position, would do.
Flence, the presumption of reasonableness is logical, and the only real
question is whether the settlement has
been procured by fraud or collusion.

The Limit to the Insured's Right
to Settle When Refused Indemnity
If the insurer is providing defense with no reservation of rights, it
is not in breach of the policy, and the
insured is not released from any duty
to cooperate. Settlement in such a
case is still in the discretion of the
insuter, and independent action by
the insured to settle the case, even
when the insurer refuses a rèasonable
in-limits offer would Jikeþ breach
the cooperation clause. In the Arizona c se of Sfun Farrn Mwt. Aøto.
Ins. Co. u. Peaton (1990),s2 State Farm's
insured, Peaton, faced liabiliry for

negügently colliding with an
adolescent on his bicycle causing him
brain damage and quadriplegia. State
Farm defended with no reservation
of rights and tendered the 950,000
policy limits in an attempt ro sertle
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the case. l7hen setdement negotia-

tions hung up on the issue of intetest
in addition to the ümits, the insured
setded with the claimant on a
"Damrofì" agfeement,s3 which is
essentiaþ confession of judgment
and assignment to the claimant of the
insuted's bad faith claims against its
insuret in settlement of the third
patty claims against the insured, in
feturn for a covenant not to execute
on assets of the insured. The Arizona
Supreme Court held that the insured
breached the cooperation clause by so
doing, because the insurer had not

breached any part of its contract. The
court, citing l7indtsa noted that the
insurer makes two explicit promises,
defense and indemnity, and one impìied promis e, to treat sertlement
proposals with equal consideration of
the insured's interests.ss In Peatoru, the
court found no breach by the insurer

that would justify settlement by its
insured. However, the coult contrasted Peaton with United Seruice¡
Autonobile Assodatioru u. Morriëí where

it

asserted the insured was freed

the obligation

from

of the cooperation

clause because the insurer was cle-

fending under reservation of rights.
of Morris, "Thus, the
insurer's reservation of rights
amouflted to the insurer not accepting full responsibility for its insured's
liabiJity exposure and allowed the
insureds to sign aDamron agreement
without being in violation of the
cooperation clause."sT
In Peatoru, State Farm argued that
only breaches of express duty to
defend or indemnify could release
the insured from obligations under
the cooperation clause allowing the
insuted to setde. The Ärizona court
tejected that argument fìnding
instead that "...the better reasoned
cases impose upon the insurer the
obligation to initiate and attempt
settlement and the fatlure to do so
may constitute 'bad faith'which
would subject the insurer to liabiìity
Said the court

in excess of policy limits."

Califotnia's 2002 case of
Hamilton

u.

Maryland Cavalq

in accord with

Peaton.

C¿.s8

is

There, the

insuted dating service was sued for

violation of clients' privacy in a complaint that proposed certifìcation for
a class action. It appears that the
insuter defended, did not deny indemnity, and offereil 9150,000 in

settlement in response to an offer to
settle within policy ümits, which it
tefused. ,\t that point, the insured

stipulated to a judgment in excess

of

policy limits and assigned its dghts
against the insurer in return for a
covenant not to execute. The California court held that, where the insurer
was defending (and negotiating), the

stipulated judgment without tdal was
insuffìcient to show that the insured
had suffered damage to
exrent by
^ny
the insurer's failure to settle.
Nevertheless, the Montana
Supreme Court in Peris u. .lafeco Ins.
Co. (1966)Ð honored a anifateral
setdement by the insured while
Safeco was intent on defending, indemnifying and negotiating pursuant
to its policy promises. Âs was reported, the court founcl the stipulated
settlement did not violate the "No
Action" clause and could be the basis
for the bad faith claim.

Does the Insurer Then Flave

to Settle Even

if

There is No

Covetage?
In California's Johansen case, the
insurer argued that holding the insurer liable regarclless of its good
taith in refusing indemnity means
that insurers must settle in all cases
even when there is no coverage. The
court noted that, if the insurer's posi-

tion of no coverage had been vindicated, there would be no liabilty

for damages for its refusal to settle.
Said the couÍt, "...all that Comønale
establishes is that the insurer who
fails to settle does so 'at its own
risk."'óo The court noted that the

insurer "...retains the ability to enter
an agreement with the insured
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reserving its tight to assert a defense
of non-coverage even if it accepts a
settlement offer. If having reserved
such rights and having accepted a
reasonable offer, the insurer subsequently establishes the non-covetage
of its policy, it would be free to seek
reimbursement of the settlement
payment from its insured."61
The insurer's lament about being
assessed liabitity for having failed to
settle a case in which coverage was
disputed may invoke some sympathy.

However, aside from the factthat
such JiabiJity comes only if the decision to deny indemniry was wrong, it
is worth considering the impot of
the alternative. The defending insurer
either has a duty to settle or it does
not. If the courts were to hold that
the insurer defending undet teservation of rights has no duty to settle
even if it is later adjudged that it
wtongfully denied coverage, then that
insurer has a huge advanfage ovet the
insuret which defends without reservation of rights. The insurer defending without reservation of rights
must abide by the law of Jessen u.
O'Danie/s to avoid exposure to excess
liabiJity. The insurer that defended
while denying indemnity would be
entirely ftee of exposure to excess
liability creating an incenlive to
defend whenever possible under
reservation of rights.

Can the Insurer use the
ttReasonable Basistt Defense

of MCA S 33-18-242?
The statutory "reasonable basis"

of MCA $ 33-18-242 does
not apply to free the insurer ftom
defense

Absolutely
free!

P¡rcn26

settlements stipulated as a result of
the insurer's wrongful refusal to defend or indemnify. The Unfair Claims

become reasonably clear." MCÂ
S 33-1.8-242 is the result of the
Montana Legislature's 1987 attempt
to corral the remedies available to
consumers against insutance companies. Subsection (3) of that statute
limits the remedies of the "insured"
against the insurer:
(3) An insuted who has suffered damages as a result of
the handling of an insurance
claim may bring an action
against the insurer for bteach
of the insurance contract, for
fraud, or pursuant to this section, but not under any other
theory or cause of action. Ân
insured may not bring an action for bad faith'in connection with the handling of an
insurance claim.

Hence, the insuted is limited to
three remedies, 1) breach of contract,
2) fra.ud, or 3) an action "putsuant to
this section." Bteach of contract and
f:'aud are not aclions "putsuant to
this section." This is impotant, be-

fot actions "pursuant to this
section," the legislature has given the
insurers a specific defense as set
forth in subsection (5):
cause,

"(5) An insurer may not be
held liable under this section if
the insurer had a reasonable
basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or the amount
of the claim, whichever is in
issue." This defense is available only if the action is

brought "under this section,"
and is not avatlalle if the action is for breach of contract
ot fraud.

Settlement Practices stafute, MCA
S 33-18-201, specifìes foutteen things
insurers may not do in claims settle-

brought for fatlure to indemnify is

ment, Subsection (6) is "neglect to
attempt in good faith to effeòtuate
pfompt, fair, and equitable settlement
of claims in v¡hich liability has

the insured's assigned claim for
breach of contract and not aclaim
"undef this section," because "this
section" refers to MCA S 33-18-242

Logically, the action being

Tnr¡r TnsNos - SuuuBn 2012

which provides for "independenr

action" based on subsections (1), (4),
(5), (6), (9) or (13) of MCA 33-18$
201.
insurer may comply with each
'\n
of those specified provìsions, and still
wrongly refuse indemnity. For example, the insurer may perform a
prompt and teasonable investigation
and timely report to the insured that

it will defend under reservadon of
rights and cite to the poìicy language
that it believes is the basis for deny-

ing coverage. If it is later adjudged
wrong in its denial of coverage, it is
liable for breach of the insurance
policy contract, The action for breach
will not be subject to a defense of
"reasonable basis in law or fact,,in
such an action.

While MCA

33-IB-242 says
that the "insured may not bring an
action for bad faith in connection
S

with the handling of an insurance
claim," this language has been interpreted by the Montana Supreme

Court not to apply to coverage disputes between the insurer and the
insured. Thomas u. Northwe¡tern Nat'l

In¡.

C0.62 (1998). InThomas, the court
said that the Legislature did not in-

tend the UTPA to be the exclusive
remedy for insureds bringing litiga-

tion against their insurers pointing
out that MC,{ 33-18-242(6)(a) pro_
vides "an insured may fìle an acion
under this section, together with any
other cause of action the insured has
against the insufer."63

As a matter of public policy,
Montana courts should make clear
that the insurer proven to have
wrongfully denied indemnity is not
freed from any duty ro setrle within
lirnits whi-le it did so. Moreover, the
courts should assure that the insurer

which defends while denying the duty
to indemnify is not better off than
the insurer which defends while
agteeing to indemnify and attempting

to settle the claim.

Conclusion
The insured being defended
under a reservadon of rights because
the insurer disputes coverage is for all
practical pufposes not any better off
than the insured being denied defense. In each case, the insured faces
ruinous liabiJity claims which he
sought to protect against by transferdng the potential losses to the insurer
in return for a premium. In that grave
uncertainty, the insured often needs
the protection of settling by stipulating to a judgment, assigning to the
clarmant rights against the insurer in
satisfaction of the judgment, and
teceiving a coverìant not to execute
in return.

That remedy which is available to
the insured denied defense should also
be available ro the insured denied
indemnity. Risk

of

fraud or collusion

is no different for either situation, and
the insurer is free to present evidence
of such. Montana's presumption that
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such a settlement is reasonable can be
rebutted by the ìnsuter.
The insurer is only responsible

for the sripulated settlement if it is
found to have wrongly denied indem.tity by defending under reservation
of rights. lØhen the insurer wrongly
denies liabiJiry it breaches its contractual promise to indemnify and frees
its insured from the "Cooperation"
and "No Action" provisions of the
policy leaving the insured free to
protect himself as he can. The insurer that disputes coverage rightly
should take the risk that the dskaverse insured will be forced to settle
through stipulation, assignment, and
covenant. That risk is identical to the
'
risk that the insurer by law takes
when it denies the insured a defense.
The risk is also similar to that which
the insuter takes when it refuses an
offer within limits. In each of those
situations, the insurer has the expertise, underwtiting experience, and

to deal with the risk that it will
be ultimately liable fot if its decision
assets

was wrong. The insured bears the
entite loss if the insurer is cortect
in denying coverage and may be financidly ruined. The challenge for
the courts in Montana is to make
sure that the insured who is wrongly

denied indemnity is not deprived

of

the only port in the storm, the chance
to setde with the only power the
insured has, the power to assþ his
rights against the wtongdoing insuret

in return for a covenant not to execute on the insured assets.
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